Using a unique data set of mutual fund transactions, this paper examines two widely acknowledged behavioural biases: overconfidence in trading and disposition behaviour. We test for the first bias by comparing the ex post profitability of the purchased and sold securities by mutual funds. Our empirical results show that the returns on the purchased securities are not worse than the returns on the sold securities, implying that the trades of mutual fund managers do not erode performance. The disposition bias, i.e. the reluctance of investors to sell losing stocks, is tested by the widely accepted methodology of Odean (1998).
Introduction
Traditional finance theory assumes that markets are efficient and investors have rational expectations and take decisions that maximize their expected utility. Nevertheless, several trading patterns have been observed that do not concur with this rationality assumption and which have been recognized as behavioural biases. For instance, individual investors seem to trade more than can be rationally justified (see e.g. Barber and Odean (2000) ; Odean (1999) ).
Several explanations have been advanced to explain the excessive trading volume observed in financial markets. As with other patterns of investor behaviour, it is difficult to interpret this excessive trading volume from a traditional perspective of rational investor behaviour.
From a behavioural point of view, 'overconfidence' has been proposed as the main reason for this trading activity (see e.g. Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) ). Overconfidence is modelled amongst others by the behavioural model of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) in which investors overreact to private information, while underreacting to public information. Moreover, this overconfidence may be enforced through 'biased self-attribution', i.e. investors attribute successful investment performance to their own skills, which further strengthens their overconfidence (see also Gervais and Odean (2001) ).
Apart from this irrational trading behaviour, the 'disposition bias' predicts that investors sell winners too early and ride losers too long (see Shefrin and Statman (1985) ).
Such behaviour complies with Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory suggesting that investors are averse to realize their losses. More specifically, under prospect theory, investors assess potential losses and gains using an S-shaped value function quantifying gains and losses rather than levels of wealth as in standard expected utility theory. In other words, this theory models the responsiveness to changes in wealth rather than to absolute levels. Potential losses and gains are defined according to a reference point. The value function displays concavity in the domain of gains and convexity in the domain of losses and is steeper for losses than for gains (i.e. loss aversion). Note that the disposition bias reflects an investor's viewpoint on the individual stocks in his portfolio and their realized performance, whereas the overconfidence bias reveals investors' beliefs about the future performance of the stocks under consideration. Moreover, disposition behaviour will only affect the decision to sell a security, whereas overconfidence will have an impact on both the buying and selling behaviour.
The present paper tests for the presence of overconfidence and disposition behaviour in institutional trades. In theory, institutional investors should be less receptive to behavioural biases than individual traders, although their trades may be motivated by more agency-related issues or incentives. 1 We examine the disposition bias and test the overconfidence hypothesis in an institutional trading context using a unique data set of mutual fund transactions. The data set comprises daily transactions over the period August 2002 to April 2007. In our setting, transactional data have a clear advantage over holding data. First of all, we do not need to infer the institutional trades from changes in quarterly holdings. Instead, we observe flows directly, i.e. we know the trading volume and exact transaction date corresponding to each fund trade, which gives insight into the dispersion of the fund trades. Secondly, we do not need to make assumptions on the direction of the trades, since the transaction type (e.g. a purchase or sale) is identified. Thirdly, we know the exact price the fund paid or received for a particular trade. Moreover, rather than focusing on a single market, our data set covers an international spread. This permits us to test whether the behavioural bias is a global effect or a region-specific trend. In addition, it extends the extant literature on the disposition effect, which predominantly concentrates on US investors. 2 Our results show that the fund managers in our sample do not exhibit overconfidence in their trading behaviour. Generally, the trades they execute are not detrimental in the sense that the purchased securities do not underperform the sold securities over a short-term horizon of 21, 42, 63, or 84 days after the trade. Therefore, we dismiss the overconfidence hypothesis. When using as reference point for assessing gains and losses the average 1 For example, institutional traders may engage in noise trading to address the moral hazard problem where the principal is unable to monitor the effort level of the agent (see e.g. Dow and Gorton (1997) ).
Moreover, fund managers tend to alter the composition of their portfolios around disclosure dates (i.e. engage in window dressing) in order to receive a positive evaluation from investors (see e.g. Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny (1991) ). Furthermore, compensation in the mutual fund industry is typically based on relative rankings, which triggers low-ranked funds to alter their portfolios in response to their mid-year position in the ranking (see e.g. Sirri and Tufano (1998) , Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) ; Chevalier and Ellison (1997) ). Likewise, relative performance structures may induce fund managers to base their asset allocation decisions on the trades of other managers (i.e. herding).
purchase price, we also find no evidence of disposition behaviour in mutual fund trades, albeit that disposition behaviour is observed in the subsample of UK fund managers. The results suggest that, rather than holding on to losing stocks, institutionals seem to cut losses early. However, we show that results are sensitive to the reference point. When average, first, last, or highest purchase prices are implemented as reference point, we generally reject the disposition hypothesis. Conversely, when considering maximum (historical peak) prices (over various time horizons), we confirm the disposition hypothesis. In short, the results are beneficial for institutional investors. They seem less prone to behavioural biases often documented for individual investors. This paper is insightful for several reasons. First of all, it adds to the literature concerning the added value of mutual funds. Indeed, since Jensen (1968) pointed out that actively managed mutual funds do not outperform passive benchmarks, there is considerable debate on the usefulness of mutual funds. Next, by showing the sensitivity of results on disposition behaviour to the reference point used, we underline the need for further research in the domain of loss aversion in general and benchmarking in particular. In our opinion, it is worthwhile to examine whether reference points differ for different types of investors (private investors versus professional investors).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature. In section 3 the mutual fund data set is described. Section 4 explains the methodology used to test both behavioural biases. In section 5 the results are discussed and concluding remarks are given in section 6.
Review of the existing literature

Overconfidence in institutional trades
If institutional investors possess managerial skills, the trades they execute should add value to the fund portfolio. More specifically, they should be able to correctly assess the future return on the securities they scrutinize. Ideally, the future return on the securities they buy will exceed the future return on the securities they sell. For trades to be profitable, the difference in return between buys and sells should at least exceed the associated trading costs. If this is not the case, the trade is detrimental to the fund's performance and does not add any value to the portfolio. Odean (1999) shows that for a sample of individual investors, the profitability of the purchases does not exceed the profitability of the sales when trading costs are ignored. Apparently, these investors 'overestimate the precision of their information'. In addition to this, the author finds that investors exhibit 'overconfidence with respect to their ability to interpret information'. Due to this overconfidence, individuals execute trades for which the difference in returns between the bought and sold securities cannot even cover the associated trading costs.
Disposition behaviour in institutional trades
Intuitively, institutional investors (unlike individual investors) are not expected to be vulnerable to behavioural biases such as the disposition effect. First of all, they are expected to act more rationally, due to better education and training. Dhar and Zhu (2006) , for example, relate the disposition bias to investor characteristics and find that the propensity to sell winners and reluctance to sell losers is significantly smaller for individuals who are wealthier and work in professional occupations. Since institutional investors trade on behalf of their clients and have more trading experience and training, it is possible that the trading behaviour of these investors diverges from that of individual investors. Secondly, an increasing amount of mutual funds is managed in an environment where trades are dictated by a computerized search for anomalies and arbitrage opportunities. For these funds, human intervention is very limited. And even if it happens, the mutual fund manager probably has to fundamentally account for it. Thirdly, even if decisions are not based on automated trading rules, protective mechanisms such as stop loss can force the mutual fund manager to liquidate the incurred losses.
On the empirical side, the majority of the literature tests the disposition behaviour of individual investors (see amongst others Odean (1998)). Evidence on this topic in an institutional trading context remains limited (see Locke and Mann (2005) ; Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ). Moreover, the scarce empirical evidence on this bias in an institutional context provides mixed results. Using a unique data set on the Finnish stock market that covers a variety of investor types, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) do not only find evidence supporting the disposition effect for individual but also for institutional investors. Shapira and Venezia (2001) examine the behaviour of Israeli investors and conclude that the disposition effect is present both at the individual and institutional level in Israel, although it is weaker for professional than for individual investors. Garvey and Murphy (2004) analyse the trades of US proprietary stock traders and find confirming evidence for the disposition effect. Likewise, Jin and Scherbina (2006) show that US mutual fund managers are susceptible to the disposition bias and illustrate that new fund managers are less reluctant to sell the losers from the inherited portfolio than continuing managers. Examining highfrequency transactions data, Locke and Mann (2005) report a reluctance to sell losers among futures traders on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Frazzini (2006) observes a disposition bias among US mutual funds and links this bias to post-announcement price drifts. More specifically, the author argues that upward price trends will trigger disposition investors to realize the gain, thereby suppressing the stock price temporarily to move to the newsupdated price level. Analogously, negative news prevents disposition investors with a capital loss to realize their losses, thereby impeding the price to fully adjust to the lower price level.
In contrast to the above-mentioned supporting evidence of the disposition bias, various papers have pointed out that institutional investors are less prone to the disposition effect. For instance, O'Connell and Teo (2004) examine the currency trading decisions of institutional investors, but find no verification of disposition effects. Instead, the authors find that institutional investors cut losses while riding gains. According to Feng and Seasholes (2005) , sophistication and trading experience eliminate the reluctance to realize losses, but only partly remove the propensity to realize gains. Using quarterly portfolio holdings data of US equity mutual funds, Cici (2005) observes a 'reverse' disposition effect, i.e. unlike retail investors, mutual fund managers realize losses more eagerly than gains. Motivated by the contrasting evidence on the disposition bias in an institutional context, this paper attempts to shed light on this matter using a unique data set of mutual fund transactions.
The Data
The data set in this study was provided by a major global custodian and contains mutual fund transactions on a daily basis. It covers all daily transactions from mutual funds that have assigned the custodian to manage their transactions. The mutual funds have an international spread and trade securities from various markets. Each transaction is characterized by a mutual fund code, a trade date, an ISIN code, the price of the transaction, the number of securities traded, the transaction type, the country in which the trade was executed and the currency in which the trade was settled. The mutual fund code allows us to identify which fund is trading. Note that the mutual funds in our dataset are completely anonymous. The ISIN code allows us to infer which security is traded. By dividing the broker amount of a transaction by the number of securities traded, we can calculate the unit price of the security for a particular trade. Transaction type is mostly purchase or sale, i.e. ownership of the securities is exchanged for cash. However, in some cases, a free delivery or receipt of securities is recorded. An example of a free delivery (where a mutual fund hands back securities to the broker without receiving money) is a merger. Free delivery implies here that the mutual fund returns the 'old' shares. Afterwards, shares of the newly created company are received by means of a free receipt. Another typical example of a free receipt or free delivery is a stock split and a reverse stock split. Apart from the transaction types mentioned above, our data set comprises lending and borrowing transactions, which are used when mutual funds short securities. However, the number of instances of these types of transactions is restricted.
To set minds, a typical transaction reads as: On the 15 th of October 2006, mutual fund X buys, on the Finnish market, 10,000 shares of Nokia and pays 600,000 EUR to the broker.
We then calculate the unit price of a Nokia stock as 60 EUR. We double-check the correctness of the calculated prices in our data set, by comparing the price of each trade to the Datastream unadjusted low and high price of the traded security on that trading day.
Theoretically, the calculated price should fall in-between. However, when performing this check, we observe that 7.53% of the observations are not situated within these bounds.
Allowing a deviation of 1%, the number of outliers falls back to 1.74% In order to prevent these outliers from disturbing our analysis, censoring is applied. More specifically, if the share price in our data set is below the intraday low, we set it equal to the intraday low.
Likewise, if it is above the intraday high, we set it equal to the intraday high. Other, far less important (in terms of occurrences), asset classes include asset backed securities, units trusts, and closed end funds. The analysis in this paper is restricted to equity trades executed by equity funds. The data set comprises 1,064,440 equity transactions, which are executed by 1,041 mutual funds. Out of these funds, we identify 571 funds as equity funds. Since funds are anonymous, we have to define a criterion for funds to be classified as equity funds. We label a fund as 'equity fund' if more than 70% of its trades involves an equity transaction.
Some funds do not execute sale transactions. In our opinion, such funds do not represent typical equity funds, so we choose to remove these funds from our sample. This further reduces our sample to 519 funds. Our analysis in the next sections is centred on these 519 equity funds. In addition, we eliminate the lending and borrowing transactions from our sample and focus only on buy transactions, sell transactions, and receipt and delivery free transactions for the construction of the holdings and computation of purchase prices. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the 519 equity funds in our sample. We split the full sample into geographical subsamples, based on the different countries in which trades were executed: the Euro countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), the Pacific region, rest of Europe, emerging markets, the UK, and the US. Table 2 displays summarizing trade statistics for each of these markets. We observe that most of the trading in our sample (41.89%) takes place on the UK market. The US market contains 23.48% of all trades, followed by the Euro countries and the pacific region. Note that relatively few trades are settled on the BRIC and other emerging markets (only 2.38%). For some analyses in this paper, we will consider only subsamples of funds that focus on respectively the Euro market, the UK market, and the US market. A fund is allocated to a particular subsample if more than 2/3 of its equity trades are performed on the respective geographical markets.
Examining the currencies of the trades in our data set, we observe that 36.44% of the trades is in GBP, while 21.92% of the trades is in USD and 12.79% is in EUR. These figures broadly, but not exactly, correspond to the percentages from the country analysis. This implies that some trades that happen in a particular country are not settled in the currency of that country. Throughout the paper, local currencies are converted into euro.
Methodology
Overconfidence
Under rational expectations, institutional investors should purchase securities for which the (risk-adjusted) returns equal or exceed the (risk-adjusted) returns on the sold securities. In line with Odean's (1999) analysis for individual investors, we calculate the average return on a buy (sell) portfolio, by examining the returns over a particular holding period following the purchase (sale) of a security to assess the future profitability of the fund trades. Unlike the author, we choose to consider shorter term holding periods than a quarter, one year, or two years, since we believe that fund managers are mainly interested in the short-term profitability of their trades. Indeed, since managers are often evaluated based on their recent performance, the profitability of their trades in the 21, 42, 63, or 84 days subsequent to the trade is more relevant. Jin and Kogan (2005) If a particular stock is not traded any longer during the holding period, the return index in Datastream will stay at the same level. Therefore the returns for the days after which the stock stopped trading, are zero. Multiple purchases or sales of the same stock on the same day and by the same fund are only counted as one transaction, i.e. these transactions correspond to only one holding period return.
In order to check whether one portfolio outperforms another, we apply the bootstrapping procedure suggested in Odean (1999) . This accounts for both return dependence and risk adjustment. Indeed, the significance test for this analysis should take into account that the returns on the traded stocks are not necessarily independent. Herding behaviour may induce several fund managers to trade the same stocks simultaneously, so the returns on these trades over the subsequent period are not independent. Furthermore, the replacement of one stock by another may be motivated by risk reducing incentives. So, it is possible that the return on the bought securities is lower than the return on the sold securities, but that meanwhile the risk-adjusted return for the bought securities exceeds the risk-adjusted return on the sold securities. We assess risk based on the Fama and French (1993) size and book-tomarket correction.
More specifically, by repeatedly drawing replacement securities for the traded securities and computing average returns, an empirical distribution can be constructed of the average return difference between the bought and sold securities. Since our trades have an international spread, we first need to define the set of replacement securities. In order to keep the data manipulations feasible, we focus on the three biggest regions in our sample, being the Euro countries, UK and US. This captures the majority of trades for our sample. We construct a replacement universe for each geographical market and for each trading day. In particular, for each trading day, we select all shares (both alive and dead) that were available on Datastream for the particular geographical market and download the corresponding return index value, market value and price-to-book ratio (all in EUR) for these stocks. Next, we construct size deciles and price-to-book quintiles for each trading day and each geographical subsample. The bootstrapping procedure then requires drawing a security (with replacement) from the set of replacement securities of the same size decile and same price-to-book quintile as the original security on that trading day. For example, for each stock traded by a European fund, we draw a replacement security from the set of all European stocks that belongs to same size decile and same price-to-book quintile as the original stock on the day that the trade was executed. Next, holding period returns over the 21, 42, 63 and 84 trading days subsequent to the trading date of the original stock are computed and returns are averaged over all purchased (sold) securities. Next, the average return difference between the purchased and sold securities is calculated. Repeating this procedure 1000 times, we can construct an empirical distribution of risk-adjusted return differences between the buy and the sell portfolio. This empirical distribution can then be used to position the actual observed difference and to ascertain whether indeed outperformance of one portfolio vis-à-vis another can be concluded.
A second calculation method for examining the profitability of purchases and sales is provided by the calendar time method, originally proposed by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) . We construct calendar-time portfolios consisting of all purchase (sale) events during a portfolio formation period of one, two, three, or four months. More specifically, for each purchase (sale) of a security during the formation period, we assign this security to the calendar-time portfolio. If several funds buy (sell) the same security, the security accounts for more than one observation. Next, an equally-weighted portfolio return is calculated for the calendar month subsequent to the formation period. Rolling forward the formation period by one month, a time-series of calendar-time portfolio returns for month t+1 is obtained.
According to Lyon et al. (1999) , this procedure eliminates the problem of cross-sectional dependence among sample firms, because the returns on sample firms are aggregated into a single portfolio. Since the number of securities in the calendar time portfolio varies from one month to the next, inference is done based on Newey-West t-statistics, in order to account for heteroscedasticity.
Disposition effect
To facilitate comparison with previous work on the disposition effect and to ensure that potential divergences in results cannot be attributed to model differences, we implement the methodology of Odean (1998). As in Grinblatt and Keloharju (2004) and Odean (1998), we define capital gains and losses only for those sell transactions for which holds that the number of stocks sold in that transaction does not exceed the number of shares accumulated (by purchase or receipt free) before the sell transaction. In addition, split trades are aggregated, i.e. trades of the same fund in the same stock that are spread over the day, are combined to avoid double-counting of realized gains or losses.
Prices adjusted for stock splits and dividends are obtained from Datastream. On each day and for each mutual fund portfolio, we compute both realized and paper gains and losses with respect to a particular reference point. The former relates to the gain or loss resulting from the sale of stocks, whereas the latter indicates the hypothetical gain or loss that could have been realized if the stock had been sold instead of held. More specifically, on each day that a mutual fund performs a sell transaction, not only the realized gain or loss from this sell transaction is computed, but also the paper gain or loss resulting from the sales of the remaining stocks in the portfolio is computed (see Odean (1998)). Realized gains and losses for sold stocks are computed by comparing the calculated sell price to the average purchase price of the stock. For the remaining stocks in the mutual fund portfolio, paper results are calculated by comparing the Datastream high and low price on that day to the average purchase price. 3 If both prices exceed the average purchase price, the paper result is labelled as a paper gain, whereas if both prices are below the average purchase price, a paper loss is counted. Following among others Odean (1998) and Lim (2006) , gains and losses are defined relative to the volume-weighted average purchase price (i.e. the reference point) from the buy transactions preceding the date of the sale transaction. Average purchase prices are computed using adjusted purchase prices to account for corporate actions (e.g. stock splits). 4 Adjusted prices are calculated using the Datastream adjustment factors on the day of the sell transaction and the days of the buy transactions.
As stated earlier, not all of the trades in our data set are pure buy transactions. More specifically, 'receipt free' transactions involve no cash exchange. The absence of a purchase price for these stocks implies that we cannot compute a realized gain or loss. We address this issue by considering the Datastream unadjusted closing price of the particular stock prevailing on the day of the free receipt as a proxy for the purchase price.
To test the hypothesis that mutual fund managers are reluctant to realize their losses, we calculate the ratio of realized gains and realized losses (Odean (1998) 
where PGR and PLR denote the proportion of gains realized and the proportion of losses realized. In this computation, the number of paper gains ( 
We also check for the possibility that investors frequently realize small gains, and occasionally take big losses. In our traditional disposition measure, this would lead to a disposition effect (much more gains than losses are counted), but in terms of realized nominal gain and loss, the numbers could be comparable. We account for this possibility by summing the money amount earned or lost. Therefore, for the realized results, each time a gain or loss is recorded, we multiply the size of the gain per share with the number of shares sold in the particular trade. For the paper results, we multiply with the number of shares that are still in the portfolio of the mutual fund. This procedure is similar to Odean (1998 ), Cici (2005 and Frazzini (2006) . Implicit in our entire setup (and in the prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ) is the assumption that the mutual fund managers assess their gains and losses on a transactional, one by one base. Alternatively, it could be that mutual fund managers rather focus on the return on their entire investment portfolio. In fact, this discussion boils down to the behavioural bias of narrow framing, as discussed by Thaler (1985) .
Under the prospect-theoretic explanation of the disposition effect, investors' tendency to frame decisions at the individual stock level instead of the portfolio level influences the decisions to sell portfolio winners and losers. Investors who are sensitive to the performance of individual stocks instead of the overall portfolio performance would exhibit a greater propensity to sell the winners, relative to the losers in their portfolios. In contrast, investors who adopt a broader decision frame and evaluate the overall performance of their portfolios are less likely to exhibit this asymmetry.
Empirically, Kumar and Lim (2005) proxy the framing mode by the clustering of trades.
Investors with highly clustered trades are assumed to be broad framers. They document that individual investors performing more clustered trades, show a lower disposition effect. Melvyn and Teo (2004) examine this issue for a sample of institutional currency traders and reach the conclusion that indeed these traders are perceived as narrow framers.
Results
Do institutional investors perform profitable trades?
5.1.1. Holding period returns Table 3 reports the returns over various horizons preceding and following institutional transactions. The first row shows the profitability of the buy portfolio, while the second row shows the profitability of the sell portfolio. The third row then shows the difference between both. The fourth row shows the percentage of bootstrapped return differences that are smaller than the actual observed difference. Values below the traditional significance thresholds of 1% or 5% would indicate that, on a risk-adjusted base, purchased securities perform worse than sold securities. Values above 95% or 99% would indicate that, on a riskadjusted base, purchased securities perform better than sold securities. Values in between would indicate that there is actually no difference between the performance of both portfolios.
Figures 1 to 4 provide a graphical representation of the average holding period returns in the trading days prior and subsequent to a purchase or sale for different geographical subsamples. Results are reported in Table 3 , where panels A to D represent the results for the total sample, and the European, UK, and US subsample respectively. For the European subsample (panel B in Table 3 ), raw return differences are positive for one and two months before the trades, and negative for three and four months before the trade. No consistent picture emerges from that analysis. However, taking into account the risk adjustment via the bootstrapping procedure, European funds seem to replace stocks with an inferior performance by stocks with a superior performance. For the three closest months, it indeed holds that on a risk-adjusted base, the purchases perform better than the sales (see also Figure 2 ). Only in the most distant period (84 days), there is no difference between the profitability of purchases and sales, after having corrected for risk. Whether this strategy was very sensible, is questionable. When examining after transaction returns, sales consistently have a higher absolute return than purchases. However, accounting for risk, no portfolio dominates another in terms of profitability.
Results for the UK subsample are shown in panel C. Apparently, UK funds sell stocks that enjoyed a solid performance over the last 42, 63, and 84 days. They are replacing these stocks with stocks for which the performance over the mentioned periods was inferior, as illustrated in Figure 3 . This holds for both the raw and risk-adjusted return differences. This strategy is profitable, as demonstrated by the post transaction returns. For each month, the purchases seem to outperform the sales. Moreover, the funds predict quite well at what point to switch the stocks in their portfolio. Indeed, 21 days before the trade, the purchases become more profitable than the sales (see also Figure 3 ). This pattern holds until (at least) four months after the trade.
US funds seem to pursue the reverse strategy. It is clear from Figure 4 that they are selling the losers in their portfolio, and replace them by winners. This is evidenced by the positive return difference between the purchases and sales before the transaction occurs.
Outperformance is quite substantial and amounts to 1.5% and more. This strategy seems to be rewarding only if the purchases are held for a short period of time. The outperformance of purchases versus sales only holds for 21 days after the sale. For the two following months, purchases and sales perform equally well (on a risk-adjusted base). After four months, the purchases underperform with respect to the sales, as illustrated in Figure 4 .
Results for the entire sample then of course should be a weighted average of the results for the individual blocks, taking into account both the number of observations and the magnitude of the return differences. For example, focusing on the first column (21 days before the transaction), the return difference between the buy and sell portfolio is positive (0.20%). However, the largest block of observations (UK) had a negative performance (-0.19% ). This can be explained by noting that the US has a positive difference with a much higher absolute value (1.55%). This return difference more than compensates the difference in number of observations. This makes deducing a particular strategy for the entire group of funds quite difficult, since it is a mixture of the strategies of the three building blocks.
Purchases outperform sales for the two nearest periods before transaction (on a risk-adjusted base). If the holding period is 63 or 84 days, the raw return difference is each time negative, but fails to hold when risk adjustments are taken into account. In the post-trade period, return differences are always positive, and each time indicate risk-adjusted outperformance of the buy portfolio versus the sell portfolio. Here, results are driven by the good performance of the UK funds. They counterbalance the inferior performance of both European and US funds.
In conclusion, our results reveal that UK funds are making profitable decisions concerning stock trades. This cannot be confirmed for European and US funds. Overall for these funds, we observe no risk-adjusted difference between the buy and the sell portfolio.
Odean (1998) quite heavily focuses on the role of transaction costs. He estimates the size of the transactions costs for a round-trip trade to be 5.9%. However, compared to our research, two important differences should be noted. Firstly (and most importantly), we are dealing with institutional investors. It is common knowledge that the transaction costs they face are much smaller than transaction costs for individual investors. Furthermore, due to technological developments, transaction costs have decreased severely. Therefore, we do not take these transaction costs into account, since their size is negligible.
Another remark is to be made on the magnitude of the returns made on the different portfolios. For both the European and the UK sample, it holds that the returns for the short term are at a level of around 8%. This is substantially lower for US funds. There, we observe returns of around 4%. Also for other holding periods, it shows that the absolute levels of return diverge between on the one hand the European and UK funds and on the other hand, the US funds. This difference can originate from two sources. First of all, the return evolution of the markets (as a whole) can differ, and secondly, exchange rate evolutions can play an important role. Figure 5 further documents these possible causes. We plot for each region, the evolution of the return index of an important indicator of the market evolution, over the time period of our sample. For Europe, we take the MSCI Europe index excluding UK. For the UK, we focus on the FTSE 100 index. For the US, we consider the S&P500 index. Panel A then shows the evolution of the return index (standardized at 100 at the start of our sample) in local currencies. Graphical examination shows that over this period, the S&P500 initially outperformed the other two benchmarks. After some time however, the other two benchmarks catch up and eventually the MSCI Europe excluding UK ends at a higher level than the other benchmarks. Panel B then takes the evolution of the exchange rate into account, since return indices are expressed in EUR in this panel. Now, we observe a clear pattern: the worst performance is for the S&P500. Second comes the FTSE, and again the best performance is achieved by the MSCI Europe excluding UK. These figures provide further insight into the low values for the US buy and sell portfolios. Table 4 reports the results when the fund sample is divided into subgroups according to their trading frequency. More specifically, group 1 comprises the 30% funds that trade the least, while group 3 consists of the 30% funds with the highest trading frequency. Group 2 comprises the remaining 40% funds. In this analysis, we restrict the fund sample to funds with a minimum of 60 trades over the sample period (i.e. funds that have one trade per month on average). Intuitively, one would expect frequent traders to be more sophisticated and thus be able to correctly assess the future return on the examined securities.
Nevertheless, the literature on 'churning' (see e.g. Brown (1996)), casts doubt on the profitability of funds that trade excessively in an effort to chase commissions. The results in Table 4 indicate that funds with a high trading frequency (group 3, panel C in Table 4) purchase securities that outperformed the sold securities in the 21 or 42 days prior to the trade. Moreover, these purchases follow the same positive trend in the months following the trade, in line with the momentum theory of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . Conversely, funds with a low trading frequency (group 1, panel A in Table 4 ) act more 'contrarian', i.e. they replace the sold stocks by stocks with inferior performance in the period prior to the trade.
This strategy seems to be rewarding over a holding period of 42, 63, or 84 days after the trade, since the purchases perform better than the sales (on a risk-adjusted base) in the posttrade period. In sum, we find that both groups execute profitable purchases, even though the purchases of both groups exhibit contrasting return patterns in the period prior to the trade. Furthermore, although we do not find evidence of a particular strategy for the middle group, it seems that they are also executing profitable trades. Panel B indeed reveals that purchases consistently outperformed sales in the post-trade period.
In Table 5 we distinguish trades in December from trades during the rest of the year to account for window dressing practices. Indeed, in December fund managers may be inclined to buy stocks which have recently increased in value to brighten up their portfolios.
However, the results in panel A contradict this hypothesis. Focusing on the period prior to the December trade, we find that the securities purchased in December did not outperform the sold securities. In contrast, as panel B reveals, we cannot reject that the securities purchased during the rest of the year have experienced better returns than the sold securities in the 21 or 42 days prior to the trade. Moreover, the results in panel A indicate that the securities purchased in December do not outperform the sold securities in the 42, 63, or 84 days subsequent to the trade. Only over a short horizon of 21 days, the stocks purchased in December outperform the stocks sold during the month. Conversely, for the non-December trades, purchased securities earn better returns than the sold securities in the post-trade period. Table 6 displays the results for the calendar-time portfolios for formation periods of one, two, three and four months. For the subsamples formed by the European, UK, and US funds, the directions of the return differences between the buy and sell portfolios are largely consistent with the results revealed in Table 3 . However, the results fail to pass the significance test, as revealed by the t-statistics. For European funds, it holds that the return difference is negative for each formation period. This is consistent with the holding period return analysis. However, also consistent is the fact that we cannot reject that there is no difference between the returns on the two portfolios. In line with Table 3 , UK funds show the best performance, at least simply by looking at the sign of the return differences. The performance of the buy portfolio is each time better than the performance of the sell portfolio. Nevertheless, in contrast to the significance results in Table 3 , the return differences in panel C are not significant. Likewise, the results in panel D for the US funds corroborate the holding period results in Table 3 . When considering a formation period of one month, the buy portfolio performs better than the sell portfolio. This does not hold true for the next formation periods. Each time, a negative difference is recorded. Again, differences are not significant. Considering the entire sample of funds, the results in Table 4 reveal a different picture than the one that emerged from the holding period analysis. The return difference is each time negative, but insignificant, which contrasts with the holding period analysis (where purchased securities significantly outperformed sold securities).
Calendar-time portfolios
Next, the relative performance of the buy versus sell portfolio is examined using a CAPM regression of the monthly return difference between the buy and sell portfolio on the market risk premia:
The market index for European, UK, and US funds is represented by the MSCI Europe excluding the UK, the FTSE, and S&P500 index respectively, all expressed in EUR. Market risk premia are obtained by subtracting the Euribor 1 month from the market benchmarks. Table 7 shows that Jensen's alpha is not significantly different from zero for this regression, affirming our calendar-time portfolio results in Table 6 that, for the entire mutual fund sample, the calendar-time buy portfolio is not significantly different from the sell portfolio.
Above, we evaluated the performance of the fund trades both in terms of holding period returns and calendar-time portfolios. In our opinion, the transactional nature of our data set invites the calculation of holding period returns, since we can pinpoint the exact trade date. Using calendar-time portfolios, transaction dates are not fully taken into account, since all transactions during a particular formation period are treated equally. Therefore, we believe that the profitability of the trades is less captured using calendar-time portfolios than via the computation of holding period returns. For example, suppose that a fund anticipates that a particular stock will exhibit a positive price trend following an upcoming earnings announcement. Using holding period returns, the return evolution of such a stock is fully taken into account, since the return is considered from the exact moment of purchase until the end of the holding period. In contrast, using calendar-time portfolios, the purchase of this stock will be identified during the formation period, and the return evolution will only be observed for the month following the formation period, which implies that only part of the price appreciation will be captured. Table 8 provides an overview of how much gains and losses are realized by the equity funds in our data set. 5 In general, more gains than losses are realized, but the funds also hold relatively more paper gains than paper losses. This should not come as a surprise, since in general the 2002-2007 period was very beneficial for stock investments. The results for the PLR and PGR ratios show that funds sell more losses than gains relative to their opportunities to do so. The PLR statistically significantly exceeds the PGR ratio (revealed by the t-statistic = 30.98). This finding suggests that we cannot reject that the spread between the PLR and PGR ratio is greater than or equal to zero. In other words, the professional investors in our data set do not exhibit the disposition effect, but instead cut losses. Our results Exchange and find that individual investors (representing 90% of all trading volume) exhibit a disposition bias, while foreign investors and domestic mutual funds (each representing less than 5% of all trading volume in their data set) do not. Similar to our results, the mutual funds trading on the Taiwan Stock Exchange display a modest tendency to realize losses more eagerly than gains. In their analysis, the disposition spread amounts to 0.26%, which is slightly below the spread of 0.39% that we report. Overall, these findings would suggest that more sophisticated investors are less prone to behavioural biases, perhaps because their trades are more motivated by incentives. In order to account for size differences between the realized gains and losses, we also report the PGR and PLR measure based on money amounts. Both measures are at a slightly lower level, but the PLR is still exceeding the PGR, i.e. the results remain qualitatively the same. This finding is consistent with the results found in Odean (1998), Cici (2005) and Frazzini (2006). Table 9 reports the average returns corresponding to the paper results and realized results in Table 8 . In contrast to Odean (1998), we do not observe that the returns on realized losses are substantially better than those on paper losses. Again, this substantiates the claim that institutional investors are less reluctant to realize their losers than individual investors.
Are professional traders reluctant to realize their losses?
Next, we split our sample into three geographical subsamples (see Table 10 ): the Euro countries, the UK, and the US. A fund is classified into each of these groups if more than 2/3 of its trades occurs on the specific market. In line with our previous results, we do not observe a disposition bias for European and US mutual funds. However, a low disposition bias shows up for the funds with a majority of trades on the UK market. da Silva Rosa, To and Walter (2005) also find evidence of a disposition effect for UK managed funds. The reason for finding a disposition effect for the UK oriented funds is not so clear. Ben David and Doukas (2006) document that disposition tends to be higher when information ambiguity is higher. Information ambiguity is measured by four concepts: idiosyncratic risk, accounting-based risk, analyst dispersion and whether or not a dividend is paid. Even without having checked this overall level of information ambiguity on the different markets, we would be surprised to see that information ambiguity differs substantially between the regions we discuss. After all, all regions have a high level of information disclosure. Therefore, we do not assume this reason to be valid as an explanation for our results.
Choice of the reference point
Although the value function in Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory clearly has a typical S-shape, less clarity exists on the location of the reference point. Indeed, in the identification of the disposition effect, the role of the reference point should not be understated, as noted among others by Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) . While the larger part of the extant literature on the disposition effect typically focuses on the average purchase price as reference point, few papers have tested different locations of the reference point. Odean (1998) still finds supporting evidence for the disposition effect when the reference point in his analysis shifts from the average purchase price to the highest, the first, or the most recent purchase price. However, Köszegi and Rabin (2006) argue that expectations represent a better reference point than historical purchase prices.
Given that the financial press typically reports the maximum price of a stock over the past year, investors may be inclined to use this price as a benchmark to evaluate the profitability of their trades. According to experimental evidence of Gneezy (2005), people use the historical peak as a reference level to evaluate gains and losses. Arkes et al. (2008) explain this observation by proving that reference price adaptation is asymmetric in the sense that investors tend to move reference points upward after gains more than downward after losses. Therefore, after a number of periods, it will eventually approach the past price peak.
An additional argument for using the price peaks is that in an institutional setting, average purchase prices are perhaps not that appropriate, by the sheer size of the number of purchases that occurs. Perhaps a fund manager will not start calculating the average prices, but will just focus on one, easy to determine, price. In line with Ben-David and Doukas (2006), we test whether our results are influenced by the choice of the average purchase price as reference point and consider the historical peak price as an alternative. More specifically, we set the reference point equal to the maximum price 6 defined over the recent three-or sixmonth period, the past year or two years. Following Huddart, Lang and Yetman (2006), each evaluation period ends 20 trading days before the evaluation day, to ensure that enough observations can exceed the prior maximum. Table 11 displays the results for this sensitivity analysis. To facilitate comparison, the first column in Table 11 repeats the results with the average purchase price as benchmark. Investors are neither prone to the disposition effect when gains and losses are coded relative to the highest purchase price, the first purchase price, nor the most recent purchase price.
Surprisingly however, disposition behaviour shows up when prior maxima are used as reference point. Regardless of the period over which this prior maximum is computed, a significantly negative difference between the PLR and PGR ratio is observed when prior maxima serve as benchmark. This finding corroborates the results of Ben-David and Doukas (2006) for US investors, who find evidence of a disposition effect once the historical peak price serves as the reference point. Moreover, it underlines the importance of the reference point in coding gains and losses.
Assuming that institutional investors assess gains and losses in a different way than individual investors, we test a few other reference points. For example, since the compensation of professional traders is linked to their past performance and the number of assets under management, we suggest taking the last trading day of December of the year before transaction as reference point, from which they start again with a clean slate. So for 6 In this procedure, the maximum is taken over a range of Datastream adjusted closing prices (i.e. prices are calibrated to the current stock price level). However, given that the intraday sell price on a particular trading day is non-adjusted, we need to bring both prices to the same level by adjusting the maximum closing price. Therefore, we divide this maximum price by the Datastream adjustment factor prevailing on the sell day for the ISIN traded, in order to bring back the maximum price to a historical value, i.e. the price level prevailing on the sell day. example, the sell price of a stock in a particular transaction in July 2006 is compared to the price of that stock at the end of December 2005. The last column in Table 11 points out that institutional investors are not prone to the disposition bias when the last trading day of December is used as benchmark to define gains and losses.
The performance evaluation of a great deal of mutual funds is related to the performance of a benchmark index. For these funds, the performance of the benchmark index can be used as reference point to code gains and losses (see Table 12 ). After splitting our sample into three geographical subsamples (the Euro countries, the UK, and the US), we consider the S&P500 as a benchmark for US oriented funds, and the FTSE and MSCI Europe excluding UK as benchmarks for the UK and the Euro countries respectively. Excess returns are calculated for each sell transaction to define whether the transaction resulted in a gain or loss. To this end, we first calculate the return on the realized sell transaction (using the volume-weighted average purchase price as reference point) and next subtract the return on the benchmark from this return. The return on the benchmark index is computed using the index value on the day of the sell transaction and an average purchase price of this index.
This index purchase price is determined using the weights used in the calculation of the average purchase price of the sell transaction and combining these weights with the index values prevailing on the day of the buy transactions preceding the date of the sell transaction. In line with the results reported above, we find no evidence of a disposition bias for European and US mutual funds when we use a geographical benchmark as reference point. Again, our results point at a low disposition effect for UK oriented funds.
Of course, because mutual funds are anonymous in our sample, we can only use a general regional benchmark. An alternative would be to focus on the trades (and holdings) of the fund, to infer whether they are trading particular stocks (e.g. stocks belonging to a particular industry, or small stocks). Then we would be able to choose a benchmark that is of more importance, and more appropriate to asses the performance of the fund. However, this is beyond the scope of our paper.
We also check whether the results depend on the trading frequency of the mutual funds in the sample. To this end, we split the sample into three groups of traders: infrequent traders, moderate traders, and frequent traders. Each group contains approximately 33% of all stock sells. Results are reported for the analysis where the reference price is the average purchase price (see Table 13 ). The PLR and PGR ratios in Table 15 suggest that none of the three groups exhibits a disposition bias, but instead a small tendency to realize losses rather than gains is observed. The same conclusion holds when the highest purchase price, the first purchase price, or the most recent purchase price serves as reference point. However, we do find evidence of a disposition bias for each group once prior maxima over the past one or two years are used as reference point. Using the historical peak level over the past three or six months shows a disposition bias for the first two groups only. This analysis shows that our findings concerning the disposition bias and more importantly, the importance of the reference point to judge the disposition behaviour, are not dependent on a particular subset of mutual funds.
Concluding remarks
In this paper two behavioural biases are examined in an institutional trading context, namely overconfidence and disposition behaviour. First, we test whether mutual fund managers execute trades that are profitable. We check whether the ex-post risk-adjusted profitability of their purchases is different from the risk-adjusted profitability of their sales. Our results reveal that, when the entire mutual fund sample is considered, the fund trades do not erode performance, since the returns on the purchased securities are not worse than the returns on the sold securities. Nevertheless, some regional differences are observed when the fund sample is divided into geographical subsamples. Apparently, UK funds are making profitable decisions concerning stock trades, since the purchased securities perform significantly better than the sold securities in the post-trade period. This cannot be confirmed for European and US funds. For the latter funds, we observe no risk-adjusted difference between the buy and the sell portfolio.
In the second part of this paper, we focus on the selling activity of the mutual funds in our sample. In contrast to earlier findings for retail investors, we document a propensity to cut losses rather than a reluctance to hold on to losing stocks for the fund managers in our sample, when the average purchase price is used as reference point to assess gains and losses. Nevertheless, when the fund sample is split up into geographical subsamples, disposition behaviour is detected for UK oriented funds. Furthermore, we show that the results from the disposition analysis are sensitive to the choice of the reference point.
Generally, the disposition hypothesis is rejected when average, first, last, or highest purchase prices serve as reference point. In contrast, disposition behaviour is observed when historical peaks act as reference point. Table 4 -Average holding period returns in the trading days prior and subsequent to purchases and sales: fund sample divided into deciles based on number of trades Table 4 reports average returns over the 21, 42, 63 and 84 trading days prior and subsequent to a purchase or sale by the funds in our sample. Funds are divided into subgroups according to the number of their trades: group 1 comprises the 30% funds that trade the least, group 3 consists of the 30% funds that trade the most, and group 2 comprises the remaining 40%. In this analysis, only trades from Europe, UK, and US are considered. The fund sample is restricted to funds with a minimum of 60 trades over the sample period (i.e. funds that have one trade per month on average). Local currencies are converted into euro. P values are reported corresponding to the percentage of bootstrapped return differences that are smaller than the actual observed return difference in the data set. 
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The market index for European, UK, and US funds is represented by the MSCI Europe excluding UK, FTSE, and S&P500 index respectively, all expressed in EUR. The risk premia are obtained by subtracting the Euribor 1 month from the benchmarks. Table 8 -PGR and PLR for the equity funds in the data set Table 8 reports the number of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses and paper losses for the trades executed by the equity oriented funds (i.e. more than 70% equity trades) in our sample over the period August 2002 -April 2007. Gains and losses are defined relative to the average purchase price (i.e. a volume-weighted average of the buy prices preceding the acquisition of the stock). Aggregating paper and realized results cross-sectionally over the equity funds and over time, we calculate the proportion of losses realized (PLR) as the ratio of the realized losses to the sum of the realized losses and paper losses. Analogously, the proportion of gains realized is calculated as the ratio of the realized gains to the sum of the realized gains and paper gains. Under the null, the PLR exceeds or equals the PGR.
Equity funds (519 funds)
Realized gains 171955
Paper gains 6490257
Realized losses 70582 Table 9 -Average realized returns Table 9 displays the average and median returns resulting from the realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and paper losses reported in table 8. Gains and losses are defined relative to the average purchase price (i.e. a volume-weighted average of the buy prices preceding the acquisition of the stock).
Average return Median return
Return on realized gains 0.2761 0.1755
Return on paper gains 0.2798 0.1748
Return on realized losses -0.1120 -0.0752
Return on paper losses -0.1222 -0.0790 Table 10 -PGR and PLR for geographical subsamples Table 10 reports the number of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses and paper losses for the trades executed by the equity oriented funds (i.e. more than 70% equity trades) in our sample over the period August 2002 -April 2007. Gains and losses are defined relative to the average purchase price (i.e. a volume-weighted average of the buy prices preceding the acquisition of the stock). We aggregate paper and realized results over time and according to each fund's geographical orientation (Euro countries, UK, US). Next, we calculate the proportion of losses realized (PLR) as the ratio of the realized losses to the sum of the realized losses and paper losses. Analogously, the proportion of gains realized is calculated as the ratio of the realized gains to the sum of the realized gains and paper gains. Under the null, the PLR exceeds or equals the PGR. Table 11 reports the number of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses and paper losses for the trades executed by the equity oriented funds (i.e. more than 70% equity trades) in our sample over the period August 2002 -April 2007. Gains and losses are defined relative to various reference points, namely the average purchase price (i.e. a volume-weighted average of the buy prices preceding the acquisition of the stock), the highest purchase price, the first purchase price, the most recent purchase price, prior maxima (three months, six months, one year, two years), and the last trading day of December. Aggregating paper and realized results cross-sectionally over equity funds and over time, we calculate the proportion of losses realized (PLR) as the ratio of the realized losses to the sum of the realized losses and paper losses. Analogously, the proportion of gains realized is calculated as the ratio of the realized gains to the sum of the realized gains and paper gains. Under the null, the PLR exceeds or equals the PGR. Table 12 reports the number of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses and paper losses for the trades executed by the mutual funds in our sample over the period August 2002 -April 2007. Gains and losses are defined relative to a geographical benchmark index. We aggregate paper and realized results over time and according to each fund's geographical orientation (Euro countries, UK, US). Next, we calculate the proportion of losses realized (PLR) as the ratio of the realized losses to the sum of the realized losses and paper losses. Analogously, the proportion of gains realized is calculated as the ratio of the realized gains to the sum of the realized gains and paper gains. Under the null, the PLR exceeds or equals the PGR. Table 13 -PGR and PLR for frequent and infrequent traders (equity funds) Table 13 reports the number of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses and paper losses for the trades executed by the equity oriented funds (i.e. more than 70% equity trades) in our sample over the period August 2002 -April 2007. We split the sample into three groups according to the trading frequency of the funds in the sample. Gains and losses are defined relative to the average purchase price (i.e. a volume-weighted average of the buy prices preceding the acquisition of the stock). Aggregating paper and realized results over time and separately for each group, we calculate the proportion of losses realized (PLR) as the ratio of the realized losses to the sum of the realized losses and paper losses. Analogously, the proportion of gains realized is calculated as the ratio of the realized gains to the sum of the realized gains and paper gains. Under the null, the PLR exceeds or equals the PGR. We assume independent observations. 
